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In McGlotten v. Connally, a three-judge federal court held that the
Secretary of the Treasury could not grant federal income tax exemp-
tions to fraternal orders that exclude nonwhites from membership or
allow gifts supporting the charitable functions of such organizations
to be deducted by the donors as charitable contributions in computing
taxable income.' In the court's view, these tax benefits constitute fed-
eral "subsidies" that, if granted to a fraternal order with a racially
restrictive membership policy, would violate the Due Process Clause
of the Fifth Amendment as well as the statutory prohibition on dis-
crimination in "any program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance" imposed by Section 601 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.2
The court also held that "a clearly indicated Congressional policy"
against racial discrimination by "the beneficiaries of federal largesse"
required that the Internal Revenue Code be construed to disallow a
deduction for contributions to fraternal orders excluding nonwhites
from membership.3 Although the plaintiff also attacked the income
tax exemption of segregated nonprofit social clubs, the court held
their exemption to be more limited than the tax benefits enjoyed by
fraternal orders, and therefore not burdened with the same prohibition
on racial discrimination.
4
The plaintiff, a black American allegedly denied membership in an
Oregon lodge of the Benevolent and Protective Order of Elks solely
because of his race, did not ask for a judicial order directing the Elks
to admit him to membership or to abandon their policy of admitting
only "white male citizens of the United States"; nor did he confine his
attack to the tax benefits that might be claimed by this one fraternal
order. His objective, rather, was to deny federal tax benefits to all dis-
- Sterling Professor of Law, Yale University.
t- A.B. Harvard University, 1969; J.D. Yale University. 1972.
1. 338 F. Supp. 448 (D.D.C. 1972); see also Pitts v. Wisconsin Dept. of Resenue. 333
F. Supp. 662 (E.D. Wisc. 1971) (enjoining state grant of property and income tax ex-
emption to clubs, societies, fraternal orders, and other associations with racially restrictive
membership rules as violating Fourteenth Amendment).
2. 42 u.C. § 2000(d) (1970).
3. 338 F. Supp. at 460.
4. Id.
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criminating fraternal orders and social clubs. The court upheld the
plaintiff's standing to raise the discrimination issue in this novel
fashion, and ruled that his action was not barred by the Tax Injtnc-
tion Act (prohibiting injunctions against the assessment or collection
of taxes)0 or by the Declaratory Judgment Act (prohibiting declaratory
judgments "with respect to Federal taxes")."
McGlotten v. Connally breaks important new ground in four areas-
the jurisdictional and standing requirements for suits challenging
someone else's tax status; constitutional restrictions on federal tax
benefits; the role of "public policy" in construing Internal Revenue
Code provisions conferring tax benefits; and the scope of the term
"program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance" in Section
601 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The procedural aspects of the
case have major implications for the maintenance of suits by "public
interest" litigants.7 The main constitutional issue at stake-the scope
of "state action"-has been largely dormant since Burton v. Wilming-
ton Parking Authority8 because statutory remedies for racial discrimi-
nation have largely replaced constitutional ones.0 McGlotten also has
5. INT. REV. CODE § 7421(a).
6. 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1970). The court did not discuss the possibility that the suit
might have been regarded, in view of its purpose, as an action "for the collection or
recovery of taxes," barred by § 7401 of the Internal Revenue Code unless the Treasury
and Justice Departments authorize it.
7. In 1971, Ralph Nader's Public Interest Research Group sued to enjoin the Treasury
Department from issuing proposed Asset Depreciation Range regulations without a
hearing under the Administrative Procedure Act. The suit was withdrawn when the
Treasury announced that hearings would be held. N.Y. Times, Jan. 26, 1971, at 16,
col. 4. After the regulations were issued, Common Cause and a group of other plaintiffs
sued for a declaratory judgment that the regulations werc invalid and for an injunction
compelling their withdrawal, primarily on the ground that they were beyond the Treas.
ury's authority under the Internal Revenue Code. Civil No. CA 1337.71, D.D.C. See
Bittker, Treasury Authority to Issue the Proposed "Asset Depreciation Range System"
Regulations, 49 TAxEs 265 (1971). This suit was dismissed when Congress amended the
Code to authorize a similar depreciation system. §§ 167(m) and 263(0, enacted in 1971.
See also Report of Special Committee [of ABA Tax Section] on Standing to Sue, 25
TAX LAWYER 631 (1972); Louisiana v. McAdoo, 234 U.S. 627 (1914) (State of Louisiana
cannot compel Treasury to collect higher duties on sugar than Treasury believed were
due); Wolkstein v. Port of New York Authority, 178 F. Supp. 209 (D.N.J. 1959) (tax-
payer cannot compel Treasury to assess income tax against holders of bonds issued by
Port of New York Authority); Panel Discussion, Standing to Sue, 26 TAx LAWYER 27 (1972).
8. 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
9. But see Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972), holding that a Moose
Lodge could retain a state liquor license despite its racially restrictive membership rules.
By describing the lodge in this case as "not publicly funded" (despite the fact that It
no doubt enjoyed the same tax exemption as the fraternal order in McGlotten) and
stating that "while [the restaurant in Wilmington Parking Authority] was a public
restaurant in a public building, Moose Lodge is a private social club in a private
building," 407 U.S. at 175, this decision may at first blush be thought to overrule
McGlotten, albeit implicitly. But the sole issue raised by the Moose Lodge plaintiff
was that the lodge's state liquor license met the "state action" criteria of Wilmington
Parking Authority. Under these circumstances, the lodge's tax exemption can be properly
regarded as a question that merely "lurked in the record," and that was not decided
by the Court.
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important implications for statutory interpretation, both in its novel
(though not unprecedented) reading of the Internal Revenue Code
and in its broad construction of the language of the 1964 Civil Rights
Act.
I. Litigation Challenging a Third Party's Tax Status
In challenging the tax exemption of segregrated fraternal orders and
social clubs and the right of donors to deduct contributions to seg-
regated fraternal orders, the plaintiff in McGlotten had to establish
his standing to raise these issues. He also had to escape the statutory
limitations imposed on tax litigation by the Tax Injunction Act and
the Declaratory Judgment Act.
A. Standing
The standard used by the court in testing the plaintiff's standing
to sue was the two-part test set out by the Supreme Court in Ass'n of
Data Processing Service Organizations v. Camp:O
(1) For purposes of the "case or controversy" requirement of
Article III of the Constitution it must appear "that the challenged
action has caused injury in fact, economic or otherwise"; and (2)
as a matter of judicial self-restraint, the court must determine
"whether the interest sought to be protected by the complainant
is arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or regu-
lated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in question."'"
The injuries alleged by the plaintiff, which were held by the court
to be sufficient to establish his standing to sue, were:
First, that the funds generated by [the disputed federal] tax bene-
fits enable segregated fraternal orders to maintain their racist
membership policies; and second, that such benefits constitute
an endorsement of blatantly discriminatory organizations by the
Federal Government.1 2
While these injuries are especially palpable to a person who is actually
excluded from membership in a fraternal order because of his race,
10. 397 U.S. 150 (1970); see also Sierra Club v. Morton. 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
11. 338 F. Supp. at 452, quoting 397 U.S. at 152-53 [footnotes omitted].
12. 338 F. Supp. at 452. The plaintiff also alleged that he was injured because his
tax burden and that of the class he represented were increased by the fraternal order's
tax allowances, but the court did not find it necessary to pass on this contention as
a foundation of his standing to sue.
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they are surely also felt by blacks who have no interest in joining the
order. This may have been why the court permitted the plaintiff to
complain not only about the Elks, but also about the membership rules
of all segregated fraternal orders and social clubs. In Moose Lodge
No. 107 v. Irvis, however, the Supreme Court held that a Negro who
had been refused service by a segregated fraternal order, when he
entered its clubhouse as the invited guest of a member, did not have
standing to litigate the constitutional. validity of the order's member-
ship rules, since he had not sought membership. 13 The Court's asser-
tion that the plaintiff was seeking "redress for injuries done to others"
assumes a constricted, and not wholly persuasive, definition of "injury,"
and it is worth exploring the consequences of the more liberal view of
McGlotten.
In applying the First Amendment, the Supreme Court has distin-
guished between the Free Exercise Clause, which can be invoked only
by a person whose right to worship has been infringed by the action
complained of, and the Establishment Clause, which can be enforced
by a broader circle of persons.14 Similarly, racial discrimination in
violation of the Equal Protection Clause might be treated not simply
as an affront to those who directly suffer from it, but as a public evil.
Only ten days after deciding the Moose Lodge case, the Supreme Court
held that the systematic exclusion of Negroes from jury service is so
offensive to the Constitution that white defendants are as entitled as
black defendants to demand a new trial before properly selected ju-
ries.15 The opinion suggests a variety of potential sources of unfairness
to a white defendant in being tried before an all-white jury, but it is
hard to avoid the conclusion that the defendant was allowed to act
more as a private attorney general to redress a public wrong than as
an aggrieved private appellant. A similar process of reasoning sug-
gests that whites, who are frequently charged with "collective re-
sponsibility" for racism even though the practice is offensive to many
of them, should have the same right as black citizens to sue to abate
unlawful racial discrimination. If this extension of the holding in
McGlotten v. Connally is accepted, the courthouse doors might be
open to white members of a fraternal order who disagree with their
organization's racially restrictive membership policies-and perhaps
to any plaintiff, white or black, whether or not interested in joining
13. 407 U.S. at 168.
14. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 429-31 (1961).
15. Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493 (1972).
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the order, who is seriously affronted by the mere existence of racially
restrictive policies.
Even with such an expansion of permissible plaintiffs to raise con-
stitutional claims, however, AMcGlotten would not greatly facilitate
tax litigation by "public interest" litigants, because valid constitutional
objections to Treasury action are few and far between. 10 More sig-
nificant, for "public interest" litigation, is the court's theory that tax
exemptions and deductions are the equivalent of "subsidies" and
hence can be viewed as expenditures of public funds. This suggests
that a public interest litigant who believes that a Treasury regulation
or decision is legally defective in any respect, e.g., that it is not con-
sistent with the Internal Revenue Code, can bring a taxpayer's suit1 T
alleging that the Treasury is making an unauthorized or impermissible
"expenditure" of public funds. In McGlotten, the plaintiff asserted
that he had standing to sue as a taxpayer; but having sustained his
standing to sue on the ground set out above, the court did not reach
this broader contention. It is unlikely, however, that the federal courts
will have much taste for re-examining every Treasury regulation, rul-
ing, or decision that a public-spirited citizen believes to be erroneously
generous to his fellow taxpayers, even though he may have to pay part
of the cost of repairing the fiscal damage.18 This probable judicial
16. Since the court upheld both the constitutional and statutory attacks on the fra-
ternal order's tax -benefits in McGlotten, it did not have to determine whether the
plaintiff's standing would have been lost had he coupled an invalid constitutional ob-
jection with a valid statutory ground. If a valid statutory ground would have saved the
complaint in these circumstances, the courts might as well entertain a case that alleges
only a statutory ground; otherwise, the plaintiff would be impelled to conjure up a
constitutional claim, however thin, just to establish his standing to obtain judicial resolu-
tion of his statutory claim.
17. See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968); Davis, Standing- Taxpayers and Others, 35
U. CHI. L. Rv. 601 (1968); Bittker, The Case of the Fictitious Taxpayer. The Federal
Taxpayer's Suit Twenty Years After Flast v. Cohen, id. at 36- (1969); Davis, The Case
of the Real Taxpayer. A Reply to Professor Bitther, id. at 375; Jaffe, The Citizen as Liti-
gant in Public Actions: The Non-Hohlfeldian or Ideological Plaintiff, 116 U. PA. L
Rav. 1033 (1968).
Further, if exempting an individual from tax is equivalent to subsidizing him, ex-
cluding an individual from an expenditure program should be viewed as equivalent to
taxing him. This corollary, if accepted, would greatly enlarge the circle of potential
plaintiffs in "taxpayer" suits.
18. In IBM v. United States, 343 F.2d 914 (Ct. Cl. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1028
(1966), the court allowed a business taxpayer to establish that its major competitor re-
ceived a favorable tax ruling on a disputed issue of law, as a prelude to winning equal
treatment for itself under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, even though
the ruling was erroneous. (But ef. Farmers' and Merchants' Bank v. United States, 341
F. Supp. 929 (N.D. W. Va. 1972).) Whatever may be the fate of this pioneering applica-
tion of the Due Process Clause to administrative procedure in the tax field, the basic
value served by permitting taxpayers to benefit equally from administrative mistakes
is equality among taxpayers, not protection of the revenue. The IBM case, therefore, has
no direct bearing on whether a citizen has a right to a judicial hearing if he thinks
that the Treasury has misinterpreted or misapplied the Internal Revenue Code to the
government's detriment, and seeks accordingly to compel the Treasury to collect taxes
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reluctance raises questions about the scope and practicality of McGlot-
ten's "tax subsidy" theory, which will be examined in detail in Part
II of this article.
B. Statutory Barriers to Tax Litigation
As stated earlier, in addition to establishing his standing to sue,
the plaintiff in McGlotten had to surmount two statutory barriers to
tax litigation-the Tax Injunction Act 9 and the Declaratory Judg-
ment Act. 20 These provisions are best understood in context.
At common law, a tax assessment was akin to a judgment, creating
an obligation to pay and a correlative right in the sovereign to collect
the assessed amount by seizure of the taxpayer's goods. No matter
how erroneous the assessment might be, the taxpayer's only remedy
was to protest his liability and sue for a refund, and even this protec-
tion against unjustified exactions depended on a statutory waiver of
sovereign immunity. The harsh regimen of pay-now-sue-later was re-
laxed for the federal taxpayer, however, by the creation of the United
States Tax Court, which has general jurisdiction to decide before
payment whether a proposed assessment of income, estate, or gift taxes
is valid. The availability of this procedure grants the federal taxpayer
who is threatened with an income, estate or gift tax assessment a choice
between the traditional remedy of paying the disputed amount and
then suing for a refund and the newer method of refusing to pay until
liability has been established by litigation. In either case, however,
the taxpayer has the burden of proving that the tax is not due.
from beneficiaries of the government's allegedly improper leniency. If the citizen at-
tempts to analogize himself to the plaintiff in the IBM case by alleging that he will
have to pay higher taxes in the future unless the Treasury is compelled to move against
the alleged delinquents, he may be told that his financial interest is too speculative and
imperceptible to satisfy the requirement of "standing to sue." The premise underlying
such a response would be that the Treasury is capable of protecting the fisc without
a private watchdog or that, if aid from the citizenry is required, it will be solicited
by the appropriate authorities. The Treasury is authorized by § 7623 of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1954 to pay rewards to informers if their information proves to be
useful; but informers tell their tales to the Treasury, not to the courts, and they cannot
compel a reluctant Treasury to move against an allegedly delinquent taxpayer.
19. INT. Rxv. CODe § 7421(a).
20. 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1970). Another possible basis for denying jurisdiction in the
suit-the doctrine of sovereign immunity-was discussed by the court only in a footnote.
338 F. Supp. at 454 n.27. The court characterized the plaintiff's action as falling within
the two exceptions to the doctrine outlined in Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609, 621-22
(1963)-that the plaintiff alleged "actions by officers beyond their statutory powers" (In
claiming that the tax benefits are not authorized by the Internal Revenue Code and that
they violate the Civil Rights Act of 1964) and that "the powers themselves or the man-
ner in which they are exercised are constitutionally void" (in claiming that the grant
of tax benefits was unconstitutional). Id. 404 U.S. 997 (1971), mer, a! 'g, Green v. Con-
nally, 330 F. Supp. 1150 (D.D.C. 1971). The court noted that Colt v. Green upheld
similar injunctive relief against the same officials.
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Though the taxpayer is thus granted a choice of methods to chal-
lenge alleged tax deficiencies, attempts to employ other methods are
restrained by two statutory prohibitions. Section 7421(a) of the Inter-
nal Revenue Code (the so-called Tax Injunction Act) provides that
"no suit for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of
any tax shall be maintained in any court by any person, whether or not
such person is the person against whom such tax was assessed." This
prohibition has been construed to have a draconic sweep, consistent
with its uncompromisingly broad language.-" Lest it be sidestepped,
the federal Declaratory Judgment Act excludes controversies "with
respect to Federal taxes" from its own coverage. For the taxpayer who
wishes to challenge a proposed tax assessment, then, Congress has pre-
scribed the procedures to be followed and has forbidden the use of
alternate routes.
But Congress has not given explicit statutory attention to the
citizen who interests himself in someone else's tax liability. Since the
plaintiff in McGlotten sought an injunction to restrain the granting
of tax benefits, he appeared to be outside the literal reach of § 7421 (a)'s
prohibition on suits "for the purpose of restraining the assessment or
collection of any tax." Holding that the central purpose of § 7421(a)
is to permit the government to assess and collect taxes promptly, with-
out judicial intervention, the court found it "clearly inapplicable" to
the plaintiff's action.2 2 Another possible function of § 7421(a), how-
21. In Enochs v. Williams Packing & Navigation Co., 370 US. 1 (1962). for example,
a corporate taxpayer alleged that it would be thrown into bankruptcy if the Internal
Revenue Service were allowed to collect social security and unemplo)ment taxes that
the taxpayer claimed were not owed. The Supreme Court refused to read an exception
into Section 7421(a) for taxes whose collection "would cause an irreparable injury, such as
the ruination of the taxpayer's enterprise." The only concession the Court was willing
to acknowledge was a right, despite Section 7421(a), to enjoin collection "it it is clear
that under no circumstances could the Government ultimately prevail." and even this
dispensation was conditioned upon showing that the government's inability to win was
apparent "on the basis of the information available to [the government] at the time of
the suit," taking "the most liberal view of the law and the facts." Id. at 7.
22. 338 F. Supp. at 454. The court went too far in saying that "[P]laintiff's action
has nothing to do with the collection or assessment of taxes," id. at 453 (emphasis added],
but it is true that he was in no sense seeking to prevent taxes fromn being assessed or
collected. The court pointed out that the preferred course of maintaining the action
in the form of a suit for refund was not available to the plaintiff. Id.
Having held that § 7421(a) leaves the door open to injunctions compelling taxes to
be assessed and collected, the court did not have to deal directly with the fact that it
prohibits suits not only by taxpayers, but by "any person, whether or not stch person
is the person against whom such tax was assessed." But the court explained in a foot-
note that this part of § 7421(a) was enacted in 1966 "to deal with the narrow problem
of the third party who held a lien which competed with the tax lien held by the Gov-
ernment," by requiring the third party to pursue a newly authorized renedy (suit under
the Federal Tax Lien Act of 1966) instead of using an injunction against collection of
taxes from the property over which he claimed a lien. Id. at 443. nZ5. The court evi-
dently read this history to mean that the 1966 amendment to § 7421(a) was designed
merely to curtail the rights of lien-holders, and not to apply to other persons. But the
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ever, is to minimize interference with the administrative process of
assessing and collecting taxes, an objective that was partially under-
mined by the McGlotten decision.
Having held that § 7421(a) does not bar a lawsuit that has the effect
of compelling, rather than restraining, the assessment and collection of
taxes, the court turned to the Declaratory Judgment Act's exclusion
of controversies "with respect to Federal taxes" from its coverage. The
purpose of this restriction, according to the court, was merely to limit
"the jurisdiction of the courts to issue declaratory judgments in the
same fashion as their general jurisdiction was limited by the Tax In-
junction Act [§ 7421(a)]." Thus, the court concluded that the excep-
tion in the Declaratory Judgment Act is "coterminous" with § 7421 (a),
and that "[i]f the injunctive relief requested by plaintiff is barred by
the Tax Injunction Act, so too will relief be barred by the Declaratory
Judgment Act."' 23 By reducing the Declaratory Judgment Act to a
mere echo of § 7421 (a), however, the court deprives it of any independ-
ent significance. Statutory redundancy is not unknown, of course, but it
is not to be presumed; and the fact that Congress amended the Declar-
atory Judgment Act in 1935 to exclude controversies "with respect
to Federal taxes" argues for giving the amendment some independent
significance. In his authoritative treatise on declaratory judgments,
Professor Borchard argued that the 1935 amendment was more re-
strictive than the Tax Injunction Act, and recommended that its
scope be reduced by amendment. 24 Other courts, therefore, may dis-
agree with the McGlotten conclusion that the 1935 amendment to
the Declaratory Judgment Act is coterminous with § 7421 (a), in which
event that amendment may prove to be a formidable barrier to public
interest litigation in the tax area.
"third party lien-holder" theory is not entirely persuasive, since it implies that such
persons were free of the prohibition of § 7421(a) before 1966. According to the Commit-
tee Report on the 1966 legislation, however, lienholders generally could not obtain
review of their claims prior to 1966:
Under present [i.e., pre-1966] law ...the United States cannot be sued by third
persons where its collection activities interfere with their property rights. This In.
cludes cases where the Government wrongfully levies on one person's property In
attempting to collect from a taxpayer. However, some courts allow suits to be
brought against district directors of Internal Revenue where this occurs.
H.R. REP. No. 1884, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966), reprinted in 1966.2 Cuss. BULL. 815, at 896.
To remedy this situation, the Committee recommended enactment of § 7426, allowing"persons other than taxpayers" to bring suits against the United States to protect their
liens on property levied upon by the Treasury. Having provided this remcdy for third.
party lienors, Congress amended § 7421(a) by adding specific language forbidding suits
by non-taxpayers and by excepting the newly enacted § 7426 from its otherwise broad
ambit. While the issue is debatable, the 1966 amendment might be construed to be more
declaratory than innovative. So construed, it may restrict all third persons, not merely
the third-party lien-holders mentioned by the court in McGlotten.
23. 338 F. Supp. at 453.
24. E. BORCHARD, DECLA ATORY JUDGMENTs 850-57 (2d ed. 1941).
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C. Binding the Absent Parties
A fraternal order that is denied a tax exemption by the Treasury
pursuant to McGlotten may seek to relitigate the issues decided there,
either by suing for a refund or by petitioning the Tax Court to ex-
punge the proposed deficiency. If, in such a later suit, the fraternal
order does not contest (or cannot successfully rebut) the charge of
racial discrimination, is it nonetheless entitled to a de novo determi-
nation of the three legal issues decided by the McGlotten court-that
the granting of a tax exemption would violate the Constitution and
§ 601 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and would, moreover, not be
authorized by the Internal Revenue Code? Not having been a party
to the McGlotten suit, the fraternal order would not be bound by
res adjudicata or collateral estoppel; at most, the original decision
would constitute an adverse precedent. Indeed, it is arguable that the
case should not even be regarded as an adverse precedent, since it was
lost by a party (the government) that had more to gain by losing than
by winning. Upholding the plaintiff's standing to sue, the McGlotten
court said that his allegations of injury insured that the dispute to be
adjudicated "will be presented in an adversary context," as required
by Flast v. Cohen. The court did not, however, consider whether the
government's financial interest in losing might stand in the way of an
equally vigorous defense. (By analogy to the issue of whether the plain-
tiff had "standing to sue," one might ask whether the defendant had
"standing to defend.") Conflicts among government agencies over the
positions to be taken in federal litigation are not unfamiliar phenom-
ena, and they may result in confessions of error or in waivers of partic-
ular defenses because to win on those grounds would conflict with posi-
tions taken in other lawsuits or proceedings. One need not imply that
a government lawyer would camouflage a half-hearted defense with a
pretense of vigor to suggest that a federal agency might be more selec-
tive and cautious than a no-holds-barred taxpayer in defending a tax
exemption case with political overtones. When the Elks sought to
intervene in McGlotten v. Connally, the plaintiff argued that the
order's interest was "adequately represented by the government" so
that there was no absolute right to intervene, and that permissive
intervention should be denied because the motion was not timely
filed. Although these objections were overruled and the Elks were
allowed to intervene, there is no way to give formal notice to every
affected party in an action like McGlotten, and it would be entirely
possible for some of the numerous organizations affected by such a
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suit to lack even informal knowledge of its pendency.20 The courts
may respond to these considerations by minimizing the precedential
weight of the public interest litigation when the taxpayer who is
directly affected relitigates the issues in subsequent proceedings. If
so, the first lawsuit will in effect prevent the Treasury from volun-
tarily granting the disputed tax allowances, a result virtually insuring
double litigation in most instances.
McGlotten v. Connally raises problems of "adequate representation"
not only for taxpayers whose exemptions are challenged, but also for
the class represented by the plaintiff-described by him as consisting
of "all qualified non-white males who are excluded from membership
in segregated fraternal organizations and clubs by reason of their race
or color and ... all other persons paying taxes to the United States."
The plaintiff did not ask for a judicial order compelling the Elks to
admit him to membership-indeed, he did not even allege that he was
willing to accept membership. Nor did he ask that the order be com-
pelled to abandon its restrictive membership rules. His demand, rather,
was that the order's tax allowances be denied.
Other members of the same class, however, might prefer an order
compelling the Elks to admit members without regard to race. But if
the Elks cling to their restrictive membership rule despite the loss of
their tax allowances, an excluded Negro who wishes to gain entry
after the decision in McGlotten v. Connally must face the fact that the
order no longer enjoys the disputed tax benefits. Despite this fact, a
court that wishes to give full sweep to the "subsidy" rationale might
decide that a fraternal order that had enjoyed "subsidies" for many
years is now so much a creature of public bounty that it must conform
to the standards that apply to public agencies, even if it offers to "buy"
freedom by renouncing future subsidies.20 The Girard College liti-
gation suggests that a private organization with a long history of pub-
lic support may not be allowed to cut the umbilical cord. 27 But this
is not the only possible answer to an excluded black who seeks admis-
sion to a segregated fraternal order after McGlotten. He might be told,
even by a court that would have ordered his admission if he had sued
25. On intervention, see Cascade Natural Gas Corp. v. El Paso Natural Gas Co.,
368 U.S. 129 (1967); Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1969); D. LoUISELL & G.
HAZARD, CASES AND MATERIALS ON PLEADING AND PROCEDURE 731-35 (2d ed. 1968).
26. Note also that the fraternal order has no way of compelling donors who have
already made contributions to refrain from deducting them under § 170(c)(4); this
might lead a court to order a black admitted despite the fraternal order's preference
for relinquishing its own tax exemption.
27. See Pennsylvania v. Brown, 260 F. Supp. 323 and 358 (E.D. Pa. 1966).
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before McGlotten was decided, that his only lever-the fraternal order's
tax exemption-was obliterated by that decision.28
II. Constitutionality of Tax Benefits Granted to
Fraternal Orders and Social Clubs
A. Tax Allowances as "State Action"
Turning from the procedural aspects of the McGlotten case to its
constitutional issues, the court commented that the plaintiff's claim
leads us into the murky waters of the "state action" doctrine, for
we must determine whether by granting tax benefits to private
organizations which discriminate on the basis of race in member-
ship, the Federal Government has supported or encouraged pri-
vate discrimination so as to have itself violated plaintiff's right to
the equal protection of the laws.29
The fountainhead of the "murky waters" which the McGlotten court
was required to navigate in making this determination was, of course,
Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority. 0 In that case, the Supreme
Court held that a private restaurant located in a building owned by
a public agency, adjacent to a public garage, was required by the Equal
Protection Clause to serve all comers regardless of race. But the Court
warned that "the conclusions drawn from the facts and circumstances
of this record are by no means declared as universal truths on the basis
of which every state leasing agreement is to be tested," that it is im-
possible to announce "a precise formula for recognition of state re-
sponsibility under the Equal Protection Clause," and that each case
requires a judicial process of "sifting facts and weighing circum-
stances." 3'
The "facts and circumstances" which led the McGlotten court to
hold that discrimination by fraternal orders with racially restrictive
28. He would, of course, be able to assert any other grounds for concluding that the
fraternal order came within the Wilinington Parking Authority doctrine. See, e.g.. the
reference in Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 US. at 178, to Daniel v. Paul. 395 U.S.
298 (1969) (recreational facility masquerading as "private club'), and tie reference in
the Douglas-Marshall dissent in Moose Lodge No. 107, 407 US. at 180, to clubs that be-
come centers of community activity, a position reminiscent of Terry v. Adams, 345 US.
461 (1953) (political dub treated as intrinsic part of election process).
29. 338 F. Supp. at 455.
30. 365 US. 715 (1961).
31. Id. at 722 and 725.
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membership rules is supported or encouraged by the Federal Govern.
ment3 2 consisted of two provisions of the Internal Revenue Code:
§ 501(c)(8), exempting the fraternal order itself from federal income
taxation, and § 170(c)(4), permitting contributions to fraternal orders
to be deducted by the donor "if such contribution . . . is to be used
exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, literary, or educational
purposes, or for the prevention of cruelty to children and animals."3'
Holding that these "facts and circumstances" by themselves constituted
federal support or encouragement, the court was able to apply its
decision to all fraternal orders, without regard to the size of their
membership or financial resources, the nature of their activities and
facilities, or their other characteristics. A local all-black fraternal order
composed of friends and neighbors is thus as much affected by Mc-
Glotten as an all-white lodge located in a state capital with a member-
ship that has a de facto monopoly of political influence.
Moreover, the "tax subsidy" rationale of the McGlotten case has
implications beyond the area of racial restrictions. Since the restaurant
before the Court in Wilmington Parking Authority would probably
have been forbidden to impose restrictions based on its customers'
religion, national or ethnic origin, political allegiance, sex, and per-
haps other characteristics, McGlotten's logic apparently prohibits the
granting of tax allowances to a fraternal order that imposes such re-
strictions on its memberships. Finally, nothing in McGlotten limits
its reach to income, estate and gift taxes; "subsidies" in the form of
exemptions, deductions, special rates, and similar allowances may be
found in other federal taxes, as well as in state and local taxes.8 4
The core of the constitutional holding in McGlotten is that the tax
allowances granted by § 501(c)(8) to fraternal orders and by § 170(c)(4)
to donors contributing to their charitable functions are "subsidies"
rather than provisions serving "as a matter of pure tax policy" to define
the scope of the term "income." Acknowledging, however, that "[e]very
deduction in the tax laws provides a benefit to the class who may take
advantage of it" and that its withdrawal "would often act as a sub-
stantial incentive" to alter the taxpayer's behavior, the court concluded
32. In relying on Wilmington Parking Authority, the court accepted the usual view
that the Fifth Amendment imposes substantially the same obligations on the federal
government, so far as racial restrictions are concerned, as the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment imposes on the states. See Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497,
499 (1954) and Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163, at 168 (1964).
33. Other tax provisions, having the same effect as § 170(c)(4), were also involved,
viz., § 642(c) (contributions by trust), § 2055(a)(3) and 2106(a)(2)(iii) (estate tax deduc-
tions), and § 2522(a)(3) (gift tax deductions).
34. See Pitts v. Wisconsin Dep't of Revenue, 333 F. Supp. 662 (E.D. Wis. 1971).
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that "more is required to find a violation of the Constitution." The
necessary additional element in § 501(c)(8), according to the court, is
that it provides tax exemption "only to particular organizations with
particular purposes, rather than across the board," thereby demon-
strating governmental "approval of the organizations and hence their
discriminatory practice."3 The deduction granted to donors by
§ 170(c)(4) was similarly found to specify "not only the [charitable,
etc.] purposes which will satisfy the statute, but the vehicles through
which those purposes may be achieved as well," thus marking "certain
organizations as 'Government Approved' with the result that such
organizations may solicit funds from the general public on the basis
of that approval."36
Both of these distinctions-between subsidies and income-defining
provisions, and between particularized and "across the board" allow-
ances-deserve close inspection.
B. "Subsidies" and "Income-Defining" Provisions
The distinction between tax provisions that serve as "subsidies" (or
as "matching grants") and those that "are merely attempts to provide
for an equitable measure of net income" or that "are simply part of the
structure of an income tax based on ability to pay" has an extensive
history in the literature of tax scholarship.37 The effort of tax scholars
to distinguish "subsidies" from provisions that "measure net income"
or that gear tax liability to "ability to pay" ultimately depends upon
the acceptance of an "ideal" or "correct" income tax base that can
serve as the standard for determining when existing law deviates from
this Platonic ideal. For those tax commentators who believe that this
35. 338 F. Supp. 456.
36. Id. at 459.
37. See Bittker, Accounting for Federal "Tax Subsidies" in the National Budget. 22
NAT'L TAx J. 244 (1969), and citations at pp. 244-46 thereof; Surrey and Hellmuth, The
Tax Expenditure Budget-Response to Professor Bitther, id. at 528; Bittker. The Tax
Expenditure Budget-A Reply to Professors Surrey and Hellmuth, id. at 538; Surrey, Tax
Incentives as a Device for Implementing Government Policy: A Comparison with Direct
Government Expenditures, 83 Hxv. L. Rxv. 705 (1970); Surrey. Federal Income Tax Re-
forms: The Varied Approaches Necessary to Replace Tax Expenditures with Direct
Governmental Assistance, 84 HARv. L. REv. 352 (1970); Aaron, Inventory of Existing Tax
Incentives-Federal, in TAX INsTnrrE oF AMECA, TAX INcu '-rzvas 3949 (1969).
Although the theory that tax allowances are functionally equivalent to direct grants
of governmental funds is popular with tax theorists, the Supreme Court in Walz v.
Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664 (1970) refused to treat them as identical, preferring in-
stead to contrast "a direct money subsidy" with "the indirect economic benefit" of a tax
exemption because, in its view, the latter is likely to involve less governmental surveil-
lance and in any event is useful to the exempted institution only if it has property or
income of its own: "The grant of a tax exemption is not sponsorship since the govern.
ment does not transfer part of its revenue to churches but simply abstains from demand-
ing that the church support the state." Id. at 675.
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distinction is fruitful, the standard is the Haig-Simons definition of
income:
Personal income may be defined as the algebraic sum of (1) the
market value of rights exercised in consumption and (2) the
change in the value of the store of property rights between the
beginning and end of the period in question.3s
This is not the place for an examination, or even a catalogue, of the
multitude of debatable judgments required in applying this definition
to the myriad of transactions and activities that millions of taxpayers
routinely engage in, which have led the Code to be characterized as
"a dank, miasmic, myxomycetous sump."39 We might simply note
that no revenue act in the nation's history has complied with even the
most elementary requirement of the Haig-Simons definition, i.e., that
increases in the taxpayer's net worth (measured either annually or at
the end of some other appropriate accounting period) be included in
computing his income. Whatever may be said for the usefulness of this
intellectual construct for other purposes, we question the validity of
allowing constitutional obligations to hinge on it. Since the first step
in identifying the "subsidies" that are burdened with constitutional
obligations under McGlotten is to distinguish between "subsidies"
and other tax allowances, the concept of an "ideal" income tax is cen-
tral to the McGlotten rationale. But if the Fourteenth Amendment
did not enact Herbert Spencer's principles of political economy, it is
equally unlikely that it was intended to enact the Haig-Simons defi-
nition of income.
It is not even clear that the Haig-Simons definition is inconsistent
with exempting nonprofit organizations (including fraternal orders)
from an "ideal" income tax structure whose primary targets are pri-
vate individuals and profit-oriented organizations. When auditing the
books of nonprofit organizations, accountants do not prepare income
statements that are comparable to those prepared for business organi-
zations, and accounting treatises provide virtually no guidelines for the
computation of the "income" of a nonprofit organization. For these
reasons, Congress might well have thought that there was no satisfactory
way to compute the income of nonprofit organizations, or that record-
38. H. SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION at 61-62, 206 (1938).
39. Galvin, More on Boris Bittker and the Comprehensive Tax Base: The Practicali.
ties of Tax Reform and the ABA's CSTR, in B. BITKER, C. GALVIN, R. MUsitAVE &. J.
PECHMAN, A COMPREHENSIVE INCOME TAX BASE? 89 (1968), which reprints articles by
these authors from 80 HARV. L. REV. 925 (1967) and 81 HARV. L. REV. 44, 63, 1016, and
1032 (1968), with additional remarks.
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keeping for this purpose would ordinarily be unduly burdensome.
Even if the income measurement obstacle is hurdled, Congress might
have concluded that some types of nonprofit organizations ordinarily
operate either at a loss or at too low a level of income to justify their
inclusion in the taxing scheme.40 Congress might also have thought
that nonprofit organizations have no "taxpaying capacity" as corporate
bodies, reasoning that any income they may realize inures solely to the
benefit of their members and beneficiaries. While this rationale would
suggest allocating and taxing the organization's income to its mem-
bers (as is done with partnership income), Congress might have thought
this solution cumbersome, promising more administrative costs than
revenue, either because of the large number of persons involved or
because of difficulty in identifying the appropriate beneficiaries (who
are not necessarily its members) to whom the organization's income
should be imputed. Even the most enthusiastic devotees of the Haig-
Simons definition of income are prepared to accept departures from
it that foster administrative convenience, avoid abrasive record-keeping
rules, disregard de minimis calculations, and serve similar objectives.
This tolerance for some play in the joints might well embrace the
tax exemption accorded by § 501(c)(8) to fraternal orders, especially
since they are subject to the normal corporate tax on any "unrelated
business income" if they engage in ordinary business activities in com-
petition with private enterprises. Whether for these reasons, or be-
cause its financial impact is difficult to estimate and likely to be
trivial, § 501(c)(8) is not included, even by footnote, on any authorita-
tive list of "tax subsidies" compiled by exponents of the Haig-Simons
definition of income.41
Once the court in McGlotten determined (despite these alternative
reasons for exempting nonprofit organizations from tax) that § 501(c)(8)
is a "subsidy," one might have expected that § 501(c)(7), exempting so-
cial clubs (which, as stated earlier, were also under attack by the plain-
tiff if their membership rules were racially restrictive) would be rele-
40. Fraternal orders were exempted from tax by the Revenue Act of 1913 along
with many other nonprofit corporations; when the applicable provision was enlarged in
1916 to include several additional categories of nonprofit organizations, the House Wa)s
and Means Committee commented:
It was deemed advisable to specifically extend the exemption to other corporations
similar to those enumerated in the present law as exempt from tax in view of the
fact that the experience of the Treasury Department has been that the securing of
returns from them has been a source of expense and anno)ance and has resulted in
the collection of either no tax or an amount which is practically negligible ....
H.R. REP'. No. 922, 64th Cong., 1st Sess. (1916), reprinted in 1939-1 Cust. BULL. (Part 2)
22, 24.
41. See lists contained in articles cited supra note 37.
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gated to the same category. But the court concluded that the more
limited tax exemption accorded to social clubs by § 501(c)(7) was not
constitutionally vulnerable. Unlike fraternal orders, social clubs have
been taxed since 1969 on their investment income,42 with the result
that their tax exemption now embraces only the income derived from
transactions with their members ("exempt function income"). The
court held that this exemption is not the kind of "state action" that
carries with it an obligation to provide equal protection:
[T]he deduction for "exempt function income" does not operate
to provide a grant of federal funds through the tax system. Rather,
it is part and parcel of defining appropriate subjects of taxation.
Congress has determined that in a situation where individuals
have banded together to provide recreational facilities on a mutual
basis, it would be conceptually erroneous to impose a tax on the
organization as a separate entity. The funds exempted are received
only from the members, and any "profit" which results from over-
charging for the use of the facilities still belongs to the same mem-
bers. No income of the sort usually taxed has been generated; the
money has simply been shifted from one pocket to another, both
within the same pair of pants. Thus the exclusion of member-
generated revenue reflects a determination that as to these funds,
the organization does not operate as a separate entity.43
This rationale fails to acknowledge that transfers of money "from
one pocket to another, both within the same pair of pants" are regu-
larly taxed by the Internal Revenue Code. Sales by a one-man corpo-
ration to its sole shareholder (and vice versa), for example, are regu-
larly taxed, as are distributions by the corporation to its shareholder.
Sales and other transactions between husbands and wives, parent and
subsidiary corporations, grantors and their trusts, and many other
categories of related taxpayers also routinely generate "income of the
sort usually taxed" by the Internal Revenue Code; indeed, the gen-
eral rule is that a transaction is subject to tax unless it can fit within
an explicit statutory exemption.
Moreover, a social club's member-generated income might be
thought even less deserving of an exemption than income resulting
from transactions between taxpayers with a common economic interest.
The reason is that income generated from the facilities patronized by
one group of members (and their guests) may well inure to the bene-
42. INT. Rav. CODE § 512(a)(3), explained by S. REP. No. 91-552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess.,
reprinted in 1969-3 Cum. BULL. 423, 469-71. But see note 53 infra.
43. 338 F. Supp. at 458.
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fit of a different group: the golfers may pay fees that subsidize the
tennis players; inactive members may pay dues that subsidize those
who use the club's facilities frequently; and so on. This economic
gain, enjoyed by members who have no community of economic inter-
est with those who "lose," might well be thought a more suitable tar-
get for taxation than the gain arising when one spouse sells property
to another, or when a one-man corporation is dissolved and distributes
its assets to its sole shareholder. Related taxpayers of this type, having
a common economic interest, are more likely to be wearing "a single
pair of pants" than the members of a social club. While countervailing
reasons for exempting the member-generated income of social clubs
can be offered, along the lines suggested by the court, it is hard to
perceive a constitutional difference between exempting the member-
generated income of social clubs and exempting both this type of in-
come and the passive investment income of fraternal orders.
This distinction between fraternal orders and social clubs becomes
even more problematical when one notes that if McGlotten had arisen
before 1969, social clubs would have fallen within its reach because
their passive investment income was then exempted in the same way
that the investment income of fraternal orders is now exempted. Al-
though social clubs no longer enjoy this tax concession, it undoubt-
edly was a source of funds that enabled some social clubs to purchase
and furnish their clubhouses and to acquire income-producing endow-
ments-to the continuing advantage of their current members. This
would not justify a determination that all social clubs are indissolubly
impressed with a public character, but it seems to invite-if the "sub-
sidy" rationale of McGlotten is accepted-an assessment in each case
of the current importance of these accumulations. Yet McGlotten
has evidently cut off this possibility by its threshold conclusion that
the only tax exemption currently enjoyed by social clubs is not a "sub-
sidy" but an income-defining provision. Perhaps the McGlotten court
would have been prepared to order a social club to admit members
on a racially neutral basis if the exemption of its investment income
from tax in past years enabled it to operate below cost today." If so,
the consequences would be formidable: every revenue act since 1909
contained "subsidies" that, though repealed, would impose continuing
constitutional obligations on any taxpayer who has not yet dissipated
the benefits received in prior years.
A final point. The stress in this discussion on the income tax al-
44. See p. 60 supra.
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lowances accorded to fraternal orders and their benefactors should not
obscure the fact that the McGlotten court also held that § 2055(a)(3),
§ 2106(a)(2)(iii), and § 2522(a)(3)-permitting contributions to the
charitable functions of fraternal orders to be deducted in computing
the donor's federal estate and gift taxes-are unconstitutional if the
fraternal order has a racially restrictive membership rule. The sig-
nificance of applying the court's "subsidy" theory to estate and gift
taxes is that tax commentators, so far, have not gone beyond the fed-
eral income tax in distinguishing between provisions that serve as
"subsidies" and those that define the taxable base or event. For other
taxes, there are rudimentary formulas to separate the sheep from the
goats, but none that commands the prestige of the Haig-Simons defi-
nition of income. If there is to be a constitutional dimension to ex-
emptions, deductions, and other allowances in taxes imposed by the
federal, state and local governments, therefore, the courts will have
to proceed without much help from tax theorists.
C. "Particularized" versus "Across the Board" Allowances
One of the sources of the McGlotten court's distinction between
"subsidies" and "income-defining" provisions contains a list of "tax
expenditures" (a term that is conceptually interchangeable with "sub.
sidies").45 An examination of this catalogue, which estimates aggre-
gate "tax expenditures" of almost $47 billion for the fiscal year 1969,
quickly discloses that "subsidies" are as ubiquitous as fire and police
protection. Virtually every individual taxpayer is the beneficiary of a
"tax expenditure," since the term includes both the itemized personal
deductions (e.g., interest, charitable contributions, medical expenses,
and local taxes) and the optional standard deduction that is taken by
those who do not itemize. Those who do not qualify for these subsi-
dies, because they are too poor to file a federal income tax return,
will find that the exemption of welfare payments, social security bene-
fits, unemployment insurance and workmen's compensation is also a
subsidy. As for corporations, they too have a rich diet of subsidies,
ranging from the $25,000 surtax exemption that is granted to every
corporation or group of controlled corporations to dozens of more
esoteric, but widely available, tax allowances.
The McGlotten decision seeks to avoid the conclusion that everyone
is subject to constitutional obligations40 by holding that some tax sub-
45. Surrey, supra note 37, 84 HARV. L. REV. at 356-57.
46. In rejecting this possibility, the McGlotten court is of course in agreement with
the commentators, who have struggled mightily either to impose limitations on the "state
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sidies entail more governmental sponsorship than others. Discussing
the tax exemption accorded to fraternal orders by § 501(c)(8), the court
says:
We think this exclusion, provided only to particular organizations
with particular purposes, rather than across the board, is sufficient
government involvement to invoke the Fifth Amendment. By
providing differential treatment to only selected organizations,
the Government has indicated approval of the organizations and
hence their discriminatory practice, and aided that discrimination
by the provision of federal tax benefits.47
It is not clear what the court meant by "differential treatment" in
contrasting the exemption of "particular organizations with particu-
lar purposes" with an apparently permissible "across the board" exemp-
tion. If Congress repealed the federal income tax, no doubt this would
be classed under McGlotten as "across the board" action, so that the
benefit thereby conferred on fraternal orders would not constitute
unconstitutional "aid" to those with racially restrictive membership
rules. But if Congress taxed all business organizations while exempt-
ing all nonprofit ones, would the McGlotten theory treat this action
as "differential treatment" of fraternal orders, and hence a forbidden
federal aid to discrimination, or as an "across the board" exemption
for all nonprofit organizations which incidentally, and without con-
stitutional objection, inures to the benefit of discriminatory fraternal
orders? If such an "across the board" distinction between profit-ori-
ented and nonprofit organizations is constitutionally permissible un-
der McGlotten, it would seem to follow that discriminatory fraternal
orders can benefit from any exemption that submerges them in a sea
of "comparable" organizations, even if it simultaneously separates
them from "different" organizations.
This reasoning, indeed, is endorsed by the court in holding that the
tax exemption enjoyed by social clubs under § 501(c)(7) is not uncon-
stitutional. After asserting that the exemption of a social club's mem-
ber-generated income is not a "subsidy" (but is rather an income-
defining provision), the court went on to ask whether the exemption
action" doctrine in recognition of the fact that no one lives in a state of statelessness, or
to replace it with some other formula. See the rcview of this "conceptual disaster area"
by Black, "State Action," Equal Protection, and California's Proposition 14, 81 HARv.
L. REv. 69 (1967), especially at 95-109; see also Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 US.
163, 173 (1972), which points out that something more than receipt of "such necessities
of life as electricity, water, and police and fire protection' is required to trigger applica-
tion of the Equal Protection Clause.
47. 538 F. Supp. at 459.
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constitutes a "mark of Government approval. s48 The answer, accord-
ing to the court, is that no approval is manifested because § 501(c)(7)
does not limit its coverage to particular activities; exemption is
given to "clubs organized and operated exclusively for pleasure,
recreation and other non-profitable purposes."
'49
The court's determination that the exemption for social clubs is not
limited to "particular activities" contrasts with its finding that the
exemption for fraternal orders is "provided only to particular organi-
zations with particular purposes." The basis for these contrasting find-
ings is apparently that the inclusion of the phrase "other non.profitable
purposes" in § 501(c)(7)-italicized by the court to stress the point-
makes the group of organizations covered by this provision broad
enough to take social clubs out of the category of "particular organi-
zations."
But the court could fairly have reached the same result for fraternal
orders. They are not singled out by the Code for unique treatment,
but are instead taxed in substantially the same manner as a number
of other nonprofit organizations, including labor unions, agricultural
organizations, business leagues, and chambers of commerce.50 These
organizations are, in general, taxed more leniently than business cor-
porations,5 1 and in this sense they benefit from "differential treat-
ment"; but if they are viewed as a group, they share in an "across the
board" exemption. Their exemptions, to be sure, appear in different
paragraphs of the Code-though all are part of the same subsection-
48. Compare Walz v. Tax Commission of City of New York, 397 U.S. 664, 672 (1970),
where the Supreme Court described the exemption of church property from state property
taxes as "neither the advancement nor the inhibition of religion; ... neither sponsorship
nor hostility . . . simply sparing the exercise of religion from the burden of property
taxation levied on private profit institutions." It should perhaps be pointed out, how-
ever, that Walz did not involve a problem of "state action." "State action" was clearly
present there, as it was in Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947). "State ac-
tion," in short, is a necessary but not a sufficient condition to an "establishment of re-
ligion." The McGlotten decision, therefore, does not lead inexorably to the conclusion
that tax deductions for religious contributions or tax exemptions for churches are
invalid under the First Amendment.
49. 338 F. Supp. at 458.
50. INT. Rxv. CODE §§ 501(c)(5) and (6).
51. But they may on occasion be taxed less favorably than business corporations,
since their unrelated business income is taxed even if they incur losses in their In-
vestment, related business, or other activities, while a business corporation can aggregate
its activities in computing income and hence is taxed only if it has an overall profit. It
is not clear, however, whether a nonprofit organization that loses its exempt status
can deduct the expenses of its nonprofit activities from its business income. If It can,
McGlotten could have the paradoxical result of reducing the taxes of some segregated
fraternal orders. See Adirondack League Club v. Commissioner, 55 T.C. 796 (1971), afI'd
per curiam, 458 F.2d 506 (2d Cir. 1972); United States v. Fort Worth Club, 348 F.2d 891
(5th Cir. 1965).
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but it cannot be that constitutional obligations hang on this accident
of statutory draftsmanship.
The court concludes its discussion of the tax exemption granted to
social clubs by observing that it does not constitute a mark of gov-
ernmental approval because
Congress has simply chosen not to tax a particular type of revenue
[the member-generated income of § 501(c)(7) organizations] be-
cause it is not within the scope sought to be taxed by the statute52
But this statement is little more than a tautology. Moreover, by de-
scribing the exempt function income of social clubs as "a particular
type" of income, the court virtually concedes, albeit unwittingly, the
weakness of the alleged distinction, relied on elsewhere, between "par-
ticular" and "across the board" legislation. This concession emerges
from the ultimate fact that both social clubs and fraternal orders have
four major "particular types" of income: dues paid by their members,
profits arising in transactions between them and their members, in-
vestment income, and income from unrelated business activities. Of
these four types of income, the first two are exempt and the fourth is
taxed, whether the recipient is a social club or a fraternal order; the
third, however, is taxed to social clubs53 but not to fraternal orders.
It is this single disparity that must support the court's distinction be-
tween "particular" and "across the board" tax allowances.
The concept of "differential treatment," then, is elusive, and the
opinion in McGlotten does little to clarify its ambit. There are, to be
sure, several efforts to buttress this rationale with references to gov-
ernmental "approval" of fraternal orders and of their charitable func-
tions. But "approval" of an organization by anyone-the government,
the organization's members, or even its officers-does not necessarily
imply approval of all its policies and practices, and the term "approval"
is in any event a dubious characterization of the purpose and effect
of § 501(c)(8). High praise for charitable, religious, and educational or-
ganizations may be found in the meager legislative history of § 501(c)
(3), but the purpose of the exemptions found in the other paragraphs
of § 501(c) is less clear. As suggested earlier, they may reflect a judg-
52. 338 F. Supp. at 458.
53. If set aside for charitable purposes, however, a social club's investment income
is treated as "exempt function" income. See INT. REv. CODE § 170(a)(3)(13)(i). Since this
part of the club's investment income is taxed neither to the club nor to the members,
they enjoy a tax allowance that is substantially equivalent to the deduction that is
granted by § 170(c)(4) for charitable contributions to fraternal orders. Had this been
brought to the court's attention, it might have refused to distinguish between segregated
social clubs and segregated fraternal orders.
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ment that nonprofit organizations are unnatural targets for income
taxation (unless they engage in unrelated businesses) or that their "in-
come" is often difficult to compute, or that they so rarely operate at a
profit that the potential revenue to be gained by taxing them is not
worth the administrative costs.
At one point in its opinion, the court states that the Internal Revenue
Code permits fraternal orders "to represent themselves as having the
imprimatur of the Government," a remark evidently referring to the
fact that such an organization can apply to the Internal Revenue
Service for a ruling to the effect that it meets the requirements of
§ 170(c)(4). More explicitly, the court says:
A contribution, even for an approved purpose is deductible
only if made to an organization of the type specified in § 170 and
which has obtained a ruling or letter of determination from the
Internal Revenue Service. Thus the government has marked cer-
tain organizations as "Government Approved" with the result that
such organizations may solicit funds from the general public on
the basis of that approval. 54
In fact, however, while a ruling or determination letter is helpful in
soliciting contributions (because it assures donors that their gifts will
be deductible), it is not a prerequisite to deductibility, which can be
established after the fact by evidence that the organization met the
standards of § 170.55 In any event, rulings and determination letters
are not the peculiar privilege of nonprofit organizations; they are
issued to taxpayers who are about to engage in almost every species of
business and personal transaction if they want an advance assurance of
its tax status for themselves or for other persons whose cooperation or
participation they wish to encourage."
Finally even if the distinction between "particularized" and "ac-
cross the board" tax allowances were far more clear, it would still be
a puzzling criterion for separating tax allowances that are burdened
with constitutional obligations from those that are not. Thus it leads
the court to this conclusion:
54. 338 F. Supp. at 456.
55. In point of fact, there appear to be no published rulings under INT. Rav. CODE
§ 170(c)(4), and the Treasury's Cumulative List of Exempt Organizations, which is regu-
larly consulted by taxpayers who want assurance that their contributions will be de-
ductible, includes § 501(c)(3) (charitable, educational, etc.) organizations but not
§ 501(c)(7) fraternal orders.
56. See B. BrrrKR & L. STONE, FEDERAL INCOME, ESTATE AND GIFT TAxATIoN 927-32
and materials there cited (4th ed. 1972).
Vol. 82: 51, 1972
Taxes and Civil Rights
We recognize that an additional class of deductions-such as ac-
celerated depreciation for rehabilitated low income rental prop-
erty [§ 167(k)], or deductions for mortgage interest [§ 163]- do act
as "incentives" favoring certain types of activities. But unlike the
charitable deductions [for contributions to fraternal orders] before
us, these provisions go no further than simply indicating the activ-
ities hoped to be encouraged; they do not expressly choose fra-
ternal organizations as a vehicle for that activity and do not allow
such organizations to represent themselves as having the impri-
matur of the Government. This seems to us a significant differ-
ence of degree in an area where no bright-line rule is possible.
'T
This distinction between the deductions allowed by § 170 for chari-
table contributions and those allowed by § 167(k) for rehabilitating
low-income rental housing has such surprising results as to cast doubt
on its validity in deciding constitutional questions under the Equal
Protection Clause. First, § 167(k) is more clearly in purpose, and prob-
ably in effect, an incentive to taxpayer behavior than the tax exemp-
tion for fraternal orders. Since the issue under filmington Parking
Authority is the extent of governmental encouragement of the activity
that discriminates, the fact that § 167(k) was clearly intended to in-
crease the supply of a particular type of housing seems to suggest that
it is at least as vulnerable as § 170(c)(4), encouraging charitable con-
tributions to fraternal orders, and more vulnerable than § 501(c)(8),
exempting the fraternal order's own income, for these provisions dem-
onstrate no clear purpose to encourage the formation of such organi-
zations. Second, though racial discrimination is odious whether prac-
ticed by landlords or by fraternal orders, it is hard to believe that dis-
crimination by fraternal orders in the selection of members is more
devastating than discrimination by landlords in selecting tenants; if
one were forced to choose, the opposite would seem more likely.
Third, when benefits are granted to any taxpayer who chooses to
engage in the favored activity, racial discrimination should be even
more objectionable, because it may be more widespread, than if the
incentive program is confined to a limited class of taxpayers. The
court's "chosen instrumentality" theory would apparently embrace
such diverse taxpayers and organizations as insurance companies,
mutual savings banks, real estate investment trusts, Subchapter S cor-
porations, farmers, qualified pension plans, and underdeveloped-
country corporations. What in the Equal Protection Clause could jus-
tify the imposition of constitutional obligations on this bizarre assort-
57. 338 F. Supp. at 457.
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ment of bedfellows, but not on "normal" business corporations, part-
nerships, and proprietorships? Finally, § 167(k) is hedged about with
a variety of restrictions that evidence a congressional concern with
the details of the taxpayer's operations, its benefits being explicitly
confined to rehabilitated housing that is
held for occupancy on a rental basis by families and individuals
of low or moderate income, as determined by the Secretary (of the
Treasury] or his delegate in a manner consistent with the policies
of the Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968 pursuant to
regulations prescribed under this subsection.
Faced by these statutory requirements, a builder who needs mortgage
or equity money from either private or institutional investors is quite
likely to ask for a ruling or determination letter of the kind that the
court regards as a.governmental "imprimatur" when issued to a fra-
ternal order, in order to assure the investors that his project meets
the requirements of § 167(k). The court's suggestion that there is more
significant governmental involvement with the operations of chari-
table organizations, therefore, is not convincing. The implication of
extensive public supervision of charitable organizations, moreover,
contrasts sharply with the views of both the critics and the defenders
of the charitable contribution deduction. Its critics allege that there
is inadequate government supervision over the organizations bene-
fitting from this "subsidy" and over the purposes for which their funds
are used, while its defenders argue that this very independence is a
major virtue of the charitable deduction.
The very fact that the court must employ such ambiguous and un-
satisfactory distinctions to avoid reaching the conclusion that every tax
"subsidy" (and therefore every individual, business, and association) is
burdened with constitutional obligations should indicate that some-
thing is wrong. Can constitutibnal rights really depend on refinements
of such delicacy?
III. Statutory Interpretation of the Internal Revenue Code
In addition to its constitutional holding, the McGlotten court held
that § 170(c)(4) of the Internal Revenue Code, when properly read,
does not authorize donors to deduct contributions to support the chari-
table functions of segregated fraternal organizations. In support of this
statutory ground for denying the deductions under attack the court
said:
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there is a clearly indicated Congressional policy that the benefici-
aries of federal largesse should not discriminate. We think this
overriding public policy, even in the absence of our constitutional
holding.. . requires that the Code not be construed to allow the
deduction of contributions to organizations which exclude non-
whites from membership.58
As a canon of statutory construction, the principle that the Internal
Revenue Code should not be interpreted to permit taxpayers to take
deductions that would frustrate public policy has a long history, pri-
marily with respect to the deductibility of fines, bribes, and illegal
kickbacks paid in a business context. 0 After a series of decisions hold-
ing that many expenditures of this type could not be deducted as busi-
ness expenses, Congress in 1969 and 1971 enacted a set of statutory
rules to govern this area. The Senate Finance Committee's 1969 re-
port announced:
The [newly enacted] provision for the denial of the deduction for
payments in these situations which are deemed to violate public
policy is intended to be all inclusive. Public policy, in other cir-
cumstances, generally is not sufficiently clearly defined to justify
the disallowance of deductions.00
While this statement might suggest that the new rules were to com-
pletely pre-empt the "frustration of public policy" doctrine, leaving no
room for its use by the courts as a guide in construing any provisions
of the Code, it might instead be read more narrowly to apply only to
§ 162, relating to the deductibility of amounts claimed as business ex-
penses.
Without explicit reference to this issue, a three-judge District Court
employed the "frustration" doctrine in 1971 in Green v. Connally,
holding that segregated private schools were not entitled to tax exemp-
tions under the Internal Revenue Code and that their donors were not
58. 338 F. Supp. at 460.
59. B. BrrrnaR & L. STONE, supra note 56, at 300-08.
60. 1969-3 Cums. BuLL. 423, 597.
61. 330 F. Supp. 1150 (D.D.C. 1971), afrd sub nora. Coit v. Green, 404 U.S. 997 (1971).
An earlier installment is reported as Green v. Kennedy. 909 F. Supp. 1127 (D.D.C. 1970).
See also Bob Jones University v. Connally, 341 F. Supp. 277 (D.S.C. 1971) (on apptnl).
temporarily enjoining the Treasury from revoking the exempt Status of segregated religious
educational institutions and from withdrawing rulings on the deductibility of contribu-
tions to them. The court stated that the purpose of the proposed Treasury action "is
not to assess and collect taxes, but to compel [compliance] . . . with certain political or
social guidelines with regard to the question of racial integration." id. at 284. See also
Crenshaw County Private School Foundation v. Connally, 343 F. Supp. 495 (M.D. .la.
1972) (INT. REV. CODE § 7421(a) requires dismissal of action to restrain Treasur) from
applying rulings described in Green v. Connally).
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entitled to deduct their gifts as charitable contributions. Two sepa-
rate, though related, grounds were asserted for these holdings: first,
that a well-defined public policy of desegregating education would
otherwise be frustrated; second, that the term "charity" was used in
the Internal Revenue Code in its common law meaning of a benevo-
lent purpose or activity whose accomplishment is not contrary to public
policy. Suggesting that racially restrictive educational institutions may
no longer be regarded as "charitable" in this sense, 2 the court went
on to hold that they do not qualify for tax exemption under § 501(c)(3)
of the Code and that gifts to them are not "charitable contributions"
qualifying for deduction under § 170.03 A premise of this conclusion is
that the term "educational" in "religious, charitable, scientific, testing
for public safety, or educational purposes" is not used disjunctively in
§ 501(c)(3), but rather refers to a species of "charitable" activity.
The McGlotten court relied on Green v. Connally in holding that
gifts supporting the charitable functions of segregated fraternal orders
may not be deducted under § 170(c)(4).6 4 There are, however, two im-
portant differences between these cases. There is an abundance of evi-
dence supporting the Green theory that segregated educational facili-
ties contravene public policy; while public rather than private schools
are the primary focus of this emphasis on racially open education, in
Green the court was able to muster a number of earlier judicial de-
cisions extending the same principle to private education. By con-
trast, the McGlotten court offered no comparable evidence that a fra-
ternal order's racially restrictive membership rules violate public pol-
icy. In Moose Lodge, decided shortly after the McGlotten case, the
Supreme Court did not mention any public policy objection to such
rules in holding that a segregated fraternal order could retain a state
liquor license, and a dissenting opinion by Mr. Justice Douglas (with
whom Mr. Justice Marshall joined) explicitly asserted that fraternal
orders are free to discriminate in their membership unless the state
becomes involved in their activities:
My view of the First Amendment and the related guarantees of
the Bill of Rights is that they create a zone of privacy which pre-
cludes government from interfering with private clubs or groups.
The associational rights which our system honors permit all
white, all black, all brown, and all yellow clubs to be formed.
They also permit all Catholic, all Jewish, or all agnostic clubs to
62. 330 F. Supp. at 1157.
63. Id. at 1164.
64. 338 F. Supp. at 460.
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be established. Government may not tell a man or woman who his
or her associates must be. The individual can be as selective as he
desires. So the fact that the Moose Lodge allows only Caucasians
to join or come as guests is constitutionally irrelevant, as is the
decision of the Black Muslims to admit to their services only mem-
bers of their race.0 5
In Douglas' view, freedom of association is the controlling value un-
less the fraternal order gets into "the public domain," and he dis-
sented not because the Moose lodge held a liquor license, but because
of two collateral aspects of the regulatory scheme. (These infirmi-
ties were an administrative requirement that every licensee comply
with all of its own rules, including the discriminatory membership
provision, and a state limit on the number of licenses, which gave the
club a privileged status when public bars were closed.)00 The McGlot-
ten court's "frustration" interpretation of § 170(c)(4), however, was not
based on the finding of state action "which underlies our constitu-
tional determination" but was regarded as appropriate even if the
fraternal order was a wholly private agency. A hint in M,1cGlotten that
a fraternal order's racially restrictive membership rules might be a
"badge of servitude" within the meaning of the Thirteenth Amend-
ment, offered to support the conclusion that tax allowances for such
organizations would frustrate public policy, is also inconsistent with
the majority opinion in Moose Lodge and the Douglas-Marshall dis-
sent.
The only other evidence offered in McGlotten in support of its
"frustration" theory is § 601 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, forbid-
ding racial discrimination by recipients of federal financial assistance.
Two more explicit provisions of recent civil rights legislation that
suggest tolerance of, or indifference to, the membership restrictions
of private clubs, however, were not mentioned. They are § 201(e) of
the 1964 Act,6 7 exempting private clubs from the requirement that
places of public accommodation accept customers without regard to
race; and § 807 of the Civil Rights Act of 1968,08 creating an excep-
tion to the requirement that federally-financed housing must be
rented without racial discrimination, by permitting private clubs to
confine occupancy of non-commercial projects to their membership.
In the absence of a widely accepted public policy against segregated
65. 407 U.S. at 179-80.
66. Id. at 181-83.
67. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(a)(e) (1970).
68. 42 U.S.C. § 3607 (1970).
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fraternal orders, then, McGlotten's reliance on Green v. Connally,
which was concerned exclusively with segregated educational facili-
ties, is unpersuasive.
There is a second weakness in McGlotten's reliance on Green v.
Connally. Since the schools in Green were exclusively for white pupils,
the tax allowances under attack would inure to the benefit of a racially
restricted group. In McGlotten, the charitable activities were to be
administered by a segregated fraternal order, but it was not alleged
that the benefits would be distributed on a racially restrictive basis;
and if they were, the decision in Green would require any deductions
claimed by the donors to be disallowed. McGlotten, however, forbids
a deduction under § 170(c)(4) even if the religious, charitable or edu-
cational activities sponsored by the fraternal order are open equally
to all persons regardless of race. In support of this sweeping result,
the court said in McGlotten:
Plaintiff alleges that he and others in his position are denied the
opportunity to help determine the purposes to which the funds
are devoted. Paternalism should not be confused with equality.09
But to the extent that the court relied on this point in holding that
§ 170(c)(4) does not authorize contributions to be deducted if they are
to be administered by a segregated organization, it offered no evidence
supporting the idea that public policy would be frustrated by deduc-
tions in these circumstances. The fruits of philanthropy, as Judge
Friendly has said in another context, "are often better than its roots."10
It is, of course, arguable that discrimination in administering chari-
table funds is so difficult to detect that an absolute prohibition on
deductions would be a desirable prophylactic if the administering
organization has a demonstrable propensity to discriminate in any of
its functions, or that a segregated organization should not be allowed
to harvest the favorable publicity produced by a non-discriminatory,
tax-deductible program of charitable activity. But the McGlotten court
suggested neither rationale in concluding that deductions are not
authorized by § 170(c)(4) and, however suitable these safeguards might
be as a basis for legislative action, there is no evidence that public pol-
icy would be frustrated by failing to embody them in § 170(c)(4).
In this connection, it should be noted that social clubs and other
69. 338 F. Supp. at 456, n.38.
70. Quoted in Green v. Connally, 330 F. Supp. at 1162, from Friendly, The Dart-
mouth College Case and the Public-Private Penumbra, 12 TEXAs L.Q. (2d Supp,) 141,
171 (1969).
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organizations that cannot act as recipients of deductible charitable con-
tributions can create separate funds or affiliates for this purpose.71 If
the fund or affiliate is organized and operated exclusively for chari-
table purposes, contributions to it can be deducted by the donors.72
Having held that public policy would be frustrated if donors were
permitted to deduct contributions to the charitable functions of a
segregated fraternal order under § 170(c)(4), the McGlo lten court might
extend this holding to donors contributing to any charitable organi-
zation that is organized or sponsored by a segregated group, but this
question was not explored in the opinion. If the court refused to
so extend its holding, a distinction without a discernible difference
would be created between a § 170(c)(4) gift to a segregated fraternal
order and a § 170(c)(2) gift to its charitable affiliate or to the affiliate
of some other type of segregated nonprofit organization.
IV. Violation of § 601 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
After holding that it is unconstitutional to accord tax exemption
to fraternal orders with racially discriminatory membership rules,
and that the deduction of contributions supporting the charitable
functions of such groups is both unconstitutional and unauthorized
by the Internal Revenue Code, the McGlotten court went on to drive
a final nail into the coffin by holding that both of these tax allow-
ances constitute "federal financial assistance" in violation of § 601 of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964.73 Section 601 provides:
No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color,
or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied
the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any pro-
gram or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.
71. See Rev. Rul. 54-243, 1954-1 Cu.%t. BuLL. 92. See also Rev. Rul. 58.293, 1958-1 CUNI.
BULL. 146 (quasi-public library maintained by bar association that was excmpt as a
business league).
72. See also note 53 supra.
73. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d et seq. (1970).
The issues to be decided in McGlotten might be reordered in the following manner:
(a) Are the tax benefits attacked by the plaintiff authorized by the Internal Revenue
Code when claimed by a segregated organization or by donors to it? (b) If the) are, do
they violate § 601 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964? (c) If not, are they unconstitutional?
On holding that deductions under 1,I-r. REv. CODE § 170(c)(4) would frustrate public
policy if the donee fraternal order is racially segregated, the court need not hase
decided either issues (b) and (c). Since the plaintiff did not allege that the fraternal
order's own tax exemption violated public policy, issue (b) was necssarily reached, but
on deciding that the exemption was condemned by § 601, the court did not have to
decide issue (c). As to the tax exemption of segregated social clubs, the court implicitly
agreed that it could be allowed without frustrating public policy, thus deciding issue
(a) without discussion; and the determination that it did not constitute a "subsid)" set-
fled both issues (b) and (c).
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"Federal financial assistance" is defined by § 602 of the 1964 Act as
"assistance to any program or activity, by way of grant, loan, or con-
tract other than a contract of insurance or guaranty."
Having previously concluded that the charitable contribution de-
duction and the tax exemption granted to fraternal orders by the
Internal Revenue Code are "subsidies" and hence are substantially
the same as federal grants, the court held that they constitute "finan-
cial assistance" within the meaning of § 602. The tax exemption
granted to social clubs, however, was held to be outside the reach of
§ 602, because "limited . .. to member-generated funds and avail-
able regardless of the nature of the activity of the particular club."' 4
In further explanation of this distinction between exempting social
clubs and exempting fraternal orders, the court said that the latter
exemption "cannot be explained simply as a matter of pure tax
policy." 75 The point, evidently, is that a provision that "defines in-
come" in pursuance of "pure tax policy" is not a subsidy, and hence
does not constitute "federal financial assistance," while a Code pro-
vision that is not required by (or that conflicts with) commonly ac-
cepted definitions of income is a subsidy. In substance, the court's
reasoning fastens the Haig-Simons definition of income, or some
undescribed variation of it, on § 602.
When discussing the constitutional obligations of persons who en-
joy tax allowances, the court drew back, as we have seen, from the
theory that all tax "subsidies" (or "incentives") impose constitu-
tional duties on their recipients.76 Instead, the court held that allow-
ances granted to "particular" types of taxpayers and serving to mani-
fest governmental "approval" are impressed with constitutional obli-
gations, but that other tax "subsidies" are not. Although the matter
is not free from doubt, the court may have intended to carry this dis-
tinction over from the constitutional area and to read it into the term
"federal financial assistance." If so, the constitutional results de-
scribed earlier in this article would be duplicated under § 601 of the
1964 Act. Thus, mutual savings banks, real estate investment trusts,
insurance companies, qualified pension plans, and a commune of
other strange bedfellows would be subject to § 601, but "ordinary"
business corporations, individual proprietors, and partnerships would
be exempt unless they receive a "particularized" subsidy for engag-
ing in a "particular" type of activity.
What these "particularized" subsidies are (other than the two con-
74. 338 F. Supp. at 462.
75. Id.
76. See pp. 68-70 supra.
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demned in the McGlotten case), however, is unclear, especially since
the court said in its discussion of the constitutional issue that this
category does not include a provision that might otherwise have been
thought to be the quintessence of "particularity," viz., § 167(k), which
permits taxpayers engaged in the rehabilitation of low-income rental
housing (under regulations consistent with the policies of the Hous-
ing and Urban Development Act of 1968 and meeting several other
requirements) to depreciate investments faster than is normal as well
as to disregard their salvage value. Yet if the court had been required
to decide whether a program of direct federal subsidies for rehabili-
tating low-income housing was "federal financial assistance" within the
meaning of § 602, it would surely have responded in the affirmative.
Nothing in either the language or purpose of §§ 601-605 suggests a dis-
tinction between programs providing financial assistance on a broad
scale and those with a more particular clientele. This supports that if
the McGlotten court were right in holding that any "tax subsidies"
constitute "federal financial assistance" within the meaning of § 602,
all tax subsidies, not merely some, would be covered.
If the court's "particular vs. general" distinction is abandoned, how-
ever, § 601 applies to all taxpayers who enjoy federal tax subsidies, i.e.,
to virtually everyone. The much-debated exemption of "Mrs. Murphy's
boarding house" from Title II of the Act,77 for example, would be
nullified if she used a corporate shell to conduct her business or
claimed an investment credit on purchasing a new stove. Even the
exemption of contracts of insurance and guaranty from § 602 itself
would be simultaneously nullified by the fact that the recipients almost
always operate in corporate form, and hence enjoy the $25,000 surtax
exemption "subsidy." Thus, the conclusion that "tax subsidies" con-
stitute "federal financial assistance" leads to surprising results under
§§ 601-605 whether one applies or rejects the McGlotlen theory that
tax subsidies can be divided into two categories, particular and general.
Whether broadly or narrowly defined, tax subsidies are also hard
to fit into the administrative scheme established by § 602 and § 603 to
enforce § 601's prohibition on discrimination. Section 602 directs every
federal department empowered to extend financial assistance to issue
rules and regulations (which are to become effective only on approval
77. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(b)(l) (1970), relating to public accommodations, whicl cx-
empts "an establishment located within a building which contains not more than five
rooms for rent or hire and which is actually occupied by the proprietor of such establish-
ment as his residence" from the obligation to serve all comers without discrimination or
segregation on the ground of race, color, religion, or national origin. See Hearings Be-
fore Subcommittee No. 5 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 88th Cong.. 1st Sems.,
ser. no. 4, pt. 2, at 1386 (1963).
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by the President) consistent with achievement of the statutory objec-
tives, and to enforce compliance by terminating, or refusing to grant
or continue, assistance. But this action is to be taken only after the
agency has advised the recipient of his failure to comply, has deter-
mined that compliance cannot be secured by voluntary means, and
has made "an express finding on the record" after granting the re-
cipient an opportunity.for a hearing on his alleged noncompliance.
The head of the agency is then required to file a "full written report
of the circumstances and the grounds for [its] action" with the appro-
priate committees of Congress, the proposed action becoming effec-
tive only 30 days after the filing of this report. This procedure is
suited to the prohibition of discrimination in programs that entail
applications for federal financial assistance, enabling the federal agency
to impose requirements, to police them while the benefits are being
received, to withhold payments when noncompliance is suspected, and
to bar the recipient from further participation in the program if non-
compliance is established. It is less suitable for supervising the behav-
ior of taxpayers whose only nexus with the responsible agency is the
filing of an annual tax return, which often does not even disclose that
the taxpayer has taken advantage of a "tax subsidy" (because the sub-
sidy's effect is-quite properly-buried in a computation of which only
the final result is carried to the return). The plaintiff in McGlolten
asked the court to order the Treasury to issue regulations under § 602,
but it is difficult to envision the proper relationship between the pro-
cedure prescribed by § 602 (administrative notice, efforts to achieve
voluntary compliance, hearings, a report to Congress, and termination
or refusal to grant or continue the financial assistance) and the court's
determination in McGlotten that the disputed tax allowances are un-
constitutional.7 8
On the question of congressional intent to treat "tax subsidies" as
"federal financial assistance," the court said:
Nothing in the massive legislative history of the 1964 Civil Rights
Act sheds any light on whether assistance provided through the tax
system was intended to be treated differently than assistance pro-
vided directly.7 9
78. In Green v. Connally, 330 F. Supp. 1150 (D.D.C. 1971), ajf'd mern. sub noa., 414
U.S. 997 (1971), the court established a detailed program for assuring compliance with
its decision, but did not order the Treasury to issue regulations nnder § 602. Under
McGlotten, the Treasury will have to find a way to separate tax allowances that come
within § 602 from those that arc beyond its reach, since a necessary implication of the
decision is that § 602 regulations are required for all tax allowances within its purview,
not merely for those before the court.
79. 338 F. Supp. at 461.
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There is, however, evidence that if "tax subsidies" were embraced by
the statutory language, the legislators were unaware of that fact. Thus,
when the House Judiciary Committtee reported the bill that became
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (with no mention in the committee report
of the possibility that tax allowances constituted "federal financial
assistance"), there were a number of separate and dissenting statements
by committee members that clearly assumed that "federal financial
assistance" referred to grants of funds and loans by federal agencies.
One member, for example, argued that the "objectives of nondiscrimi-
nation with respect to Federal financial assistance programs can be
achieved in a much simpler and more workable way" by requiring
"recipients of federal financial assistance, as a condition to receiving
the grant or loan, [to] enter into an enforceable undertaking against
discrimination in the administration of the program," to be enforced
by legal remedies "for the violation of a contract."80 This procedure,
suggested by a Congressman who supported the bill as reported, could
hardly have been proposed by someone who thought that tax subsi-
dies were included in the term "Federal financial assistance." Oppo-
nents of the legislation, in their minority report and statements, ob-
jected to it on almost every conceivable ground, going far afield for
ammunition; yet they did not even suggest that tax subsidies-probably
the most ubiquitous of all federal programs-could be the foundation
of federal action under §§ 601-605. Conjuring up a reign of terror for
farmers, homeowners, banks, labor unions, the press, veterans, teachers,
and others, they listed dozens of federal benefits that might be with-
held but conspicuously failed to mention tax "subsidies." One minor-
ity statement, for example, listed 65 federal programs that would be
affected;' L there would have been little need to reach out for programs
aiding Cuban refugees, the blind, teachers of mentally retarded chil-
dren, and librarians if dozens of federal tax subsidies of much broader
import could have been plausibly included in what was intended as a
comprehensive parade of horribles.
Similarly, a list of covered programs prepared for Congressman
Celler by the Deputy Attorney General made no mention of tax allow-
ances, though it embraced such minor items as payments to three coun-
ties in Minnesota from the national forest fund, expenditures to con-
trol outdoor advertising, payments to the National Board for Promo-
80. Additional Views of Hon. George Meader, H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1963), reprinted in 2 US. CODE & ADMtIN. NEws 2391, 2425 (1954).
81. Separate Minority Views of Hon. Richard H. Pof and Hon. William Cramer, id.
at 2471-73.
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tion of Rifle Practice, payments under the Migratory Bird Conser-
vation Act, and grants for the drainage of certain anthracite mines.
Moreover, the letter of transmittal expressed the view that grants to
individuals do not constitute "assistance to any program or activity"
within the meaning of § 602.82 The congressional debate on Title VI
(§§ 601-603) also supports the conclusion that the title was concerned
with programs entailing money expenditures rather than tax allow-
ances. Thus, Congressman Powell pointed out that Title VI was a
generalized version of the so-called Powell Amendment, which he had
offered as a rider to a number of appropriations bills:
Title VI would avoid the recurrence of acrimonious debate in the
Congress as to discrimination in discussing individual Federal aid
programs.... The argument that is customarily made is that if
the provision [i.e., the Powell Amendment] prevailed, the Senate
might become involved in prolonged or protracted debate, or even
a filibuster, and the result might be no legislation whatever.83
Similarly, Senator Pastore argued that Title VI would expedite the
legislative process:
It is to avoid such a situation that Title VI would constitute as
permanent policy of the U.S. Government the principle that dis-
crimination will not be tolerated. This would eliminate all the
confusion and discussion that arises every time a grant bill comes
before the Senate.
84
The first official public suggestion that Title VI's jurisdiction might
include not only the kind of programs listed by the Deputy Attorney
General in his letter to Congressman Celler, but also tax allowances,
was made in a 1967 report on southern school desegregation by the
U.S. Commission on Civil Rights. Describing the growth of private
southern segregated schools, the Commission made this recommenda-
tion:
The Secretary of the Treasury should request an opinion of the
Attorney General as to whether Title VI of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 or the Internal Revenue Code authorizes or requires the
82. Hearings on H.R. 7152 as amended by House Comn. on the Judiciary, 88th
Cong., 2d Sess., pt. IV, ser. 4, at 2773, 2776-78 (1964).
83. 110 CoNo. REC., Part 2, 2465 (1963).
84. Id. at 7061 [emphasis added]. For a detailed examination of Title Vi's evolution,
scope, and effect, see Comment: Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964-Implementation
and Impact, 36 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 824 (1968), which contains no evidence that the
term "federal financial assistance" was intended to embrace tax allowances. For an of-
ficial exposition of the scope of Title VI, see U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIuTs, FEDERAL
CIVIL RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT EFFORT 550-764 (1970).
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Internal Revenue Service to withhold tax benefits presently being
afforded by the Service to racially segregated private schools, or
whether congressional action is necessary to assure that such bene-
fits are withheld. The Attorney General should consider whether,
because of such benefits, the Federal Government is so signifi-
cantly involved in private school segregation as to justify legal
action to enjoin the continued operation on a discriminatory basis
of schools receiving such benefits. If the Attorney General deter-
mines that present legal authority is inadequate either to withhold
tax benefits or to permit the institution of litigation, he should
recommend appropriate legislation to the President."
The Commission coupled this carefully guarded suggestion with a
disclaimer of any intent to extend Title VI to social clubs and fra-
ternal orders, explicitly citing § 501(c)(7) and (8) as provisions that
would be beyond the ambit of Title VI. In drawing this distinction be-
tween segregated schools and segregated fraternal orders and social
clubs, the Commission asserted that the rights of privacy and of free
association might have to be preferred "over the claim of equality, even
if the discrimination is based on race."'"" The Civil Rights Division
of the Justice Department subsequently adopted the position that was
eventually endorsed by Green v. Connally (viz., that segregated schools
are not organized and operated "for charitable or educational pur-
poses" within the meaning of the Internal Revenue Code) in an un-
published opinion that cited Title VI as evidence of a national policy
against segregated education. Apparently the Division did not assert,
however, that tax allowances constitute federal financial assistance re-
quiring Treasury action under Title VI. T If it had adopted this con-
struction of Title VI, and if it had won the approval of the Attorney
General, presumably the government should not have offered a de-
fense on the merits in the McGlotten case.
Thus, neither the legislative history of Title VI nor the understand-
ing of the agencies with major responsibility for its administration pro-
vide any solid support for treating federal tax allowances as "federal
financial assistance" within the meaning of § 602.
85. U.S. CosssissIoN ON CIVIL RIGHTS RE'ORT, SOUTIE EPN ScHooL DESLGREG.ATION, 1966-
67, at 99 (1967).
86. Id. at 160. The constitutional flavor of this comment implies that Congress did
not have the power to bring these exemptions within Title VI. If this were the only
reason for excluding social clubs and fraternal orders from Title VI, one might deduce
that all tax allowances were covered except those that are constitutionally immune. The
Commission, however, was obviously preoccupied with the private school problem, and
made no effort to present a developed theory of Title VI's coverage.
87. The Division's memorandum is summarized in U.S. Co.MMIssloN ON CIVIL RiGurb,
FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS ENFORCENMNT EFFORT 563 (1970), which also describes the action
taken by the Internal Revenue Service.
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Conclusion
Viewed in the abstract, fraternal orders and social clubs with racially
restrictive membership rules are not admirable institutions. The same
can be said of groups with restrictions based on religion, ethnic or
national origin, sex, and political affiliation; these tests can also pro-
duce "suspect classifications," and they are as unconstitutional as race
when used to determine who may serve on a jury, attend a public
school, or be served in a place of public accommodation. But when,
moving from the abstract to the particular, one examines the objectives
and activities of particular fraternal orders and social clubs, member-
ship restrictions based on any of these characteristics no longer seem
automatically to be offensive. The correct adjective, rather, may be
ludicrous, harmless, innocent, anachronistic, defensive, evanescent,
inconsequential, functional, embattled, or praiseworthy. Even when
the restrictions are invidious, a governmental program to discover and
eradicate them necessarily imposes social costs; a society that tries to
punish every instance of man's inhumanity to man may lose its human-
ity while crusading against the enemy. The "right of free association"
and "the right of privacy" that have been vindicated in a series of
recent Supreme Court decisions are labels recognizing the social value
of membership organizations and the dangers inherent in governmental
controls. s8 Like free speech and the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion, however, the rights of free association and privacy cannot be re-
served for the noblest among us.
If full sway is given to the McGlotten theory that tax allowances are
equivalent to direct grants of public funds and hence impose consti-
tutional obligations on the recipient, no one will be immune. As we
have pointed out, the Internal Revenue Code is a pudding with plums
for everyone. In theory, the "tax subsidy" theory does not constrict
the right of free association or the right to privacy, because the tax
allowances can be renounced by the recipient or eliminated by Con-
gress. But the former remedy, by distinguishing among associations
by reference to their ideologies, would make some pay a high price for
their enjoyment of the rights in question. On the other hand, the con-
gressional remedy of repeal, resting on the dubious premise that there
is a "constitutionally neutral" definition of taxable income, would be
costly to all associations.
88. See NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1948); Gibson v. Florida Investigation Com-
mittee, 372 U.S. 539 (1963); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482-84 (1965); su pra
note 65.
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The McGlotten court sought to minimize these consequences by
picking and choosing among tax subsidies. But its distinctions, in our
opinion, are unworkable and, as adumbrated by the court, impose or
withhold constitutional obligations in a puzzling fashion. The "state
action" doctrine as applied in Burton v. WVilmington Parking A uthor-
ity is imprecise, but it permits values to be weighed and judgments
to be made, so that a cluster of rooms in a college dormitory can be
distinguished from a restaurant in a public facility, a bowling league
from a bar association, and a radio repair shop from a TV broadcast-
ing network. 9 Because application of the Equal Protection Clause is
"peculiarly dependent for its invocation upon appropriate facts,"
the Court warned against automatically extending the conclusions
"drawn from the facts and circumstances of this record" to "every state
leasing agreement." 90 It seems equally likely that it would have been
willing to distinguish among tenants in the very same building, and
that the obligation to serve all potential customers that was imposed
on the restaurant in the case before the court would not necessarily
have been imposed on a religious organization, ethnic society, labor
union, fraternal order, or social club renting office space in the build-
ing. Wilmington Parking Authority thus enables the lower courts to
focus on facts and circumstances that matter. By contrast, the tax sub-
sidy theory-whether in an unadulterated form or as watered down
by McGlotten-turns on technical niceties of tax law that are unre-
lated to the impact of the organization's behavior on the persons ex-
cluded by its membership rules or other restrictive practices. It would,
therefore, be a mistake to use this theory to "constitutionalize" the
Internal Revenue Code.
89. See Black, supra note 46. See also Brown, Emerson, Falk & Freedman. The Equal
Rights Amendment: A Constitutional Basis for Equal Rights for JI'omen, 80 YALE L.J.
871, 905-07 (1971).
90. 365 U.S. at 725-26.
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